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Intimacy and Injury:   
How Law Has Changed for Battered Women   
 
By Phyllis Goldfarb∗    
 
 
I. History 
 Law’s response to the problem of violence in intimate relationships has not been swift.  
For centuries, legal actors neglected to notice or address the issue, an omission linked in large 
part to the broader problem of gender inequality deeply entrenched in the culture.  Indeed, the 
common law of the Anglo-American world permitted the “master of the household” to “chastise” 
his wife using corporal punishment, as long as he did not inflict permanent physical injuries.1  
 Although American judges had explicitly rejected the doctrine of chastisement by the late 
nineteenth century,2 they began substituting for it a common law doctrine of family privacy that 
justified legal non-intervention in the marital relationship, despite evidence that a husband was 
subjecting his wife to physical abuse.3  Since this shift in the justification for non-intervention 
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1  See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beatings as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2123 
(1996). 
 
2  Id. at 2129. 
 
3  Id. at 2151-55 (“During the antebellum era, courts began to invoke marital privacy as a supplementary rationale 
for chastisement, in order to justify the common law doctrine [of non-intervention] within the discourse of 
companionate marriage... A judge reasoning about marriage as a companionate relationship could invoke values of 
marital privacy to justify giving wife beaters immunity from prosecution much as he could invoke authority–based 
conceptions of marriage to justify giving husbands a formal prerogative to beat their wives.”).   
 An emerging doctrine of marital privacy not only prevented the imposition of criminal law sanctions in 
cases of marital violence, it also precluded lawsuits in tort brought by the victims of marital violence.  See id. at 
2163 (“Regardless of whether a husband beat, choked, stabbed, or shot his wife, all courts reviewing such claims 
coincided with the era of Reconstruction,4 it is not surprising that the understanding of which 
families were to be accorded privacy was racialized.5  When the customs of racial hierarchy were 
threatened by the abolition of slavery,6 intimate violence came to be understood as a problem of 
African-American and poor immigrant men, such as those of German and Irish descent.7  Legal 
sanctions, particularly the punishment of flogging, were imposed in some of these cases,8 but not 
in instances of intimate violence committed by men of privileged classes.9 
                                                                                                                                                             
initially rejected them, reasoning that spouses could not sue each other in tort – and buttressing this conclusion with 
justifications couched in the language of affect and privacy.”).   
 
4  Id. at 2119-20 (“A survey of criminal and tort law during the Reconstruction Era reveals that ... chastisement law 
was supplanted by a new body of marital violence policies that were premised on a variety of gender-, race-, and 
class–based assumptions.”). One of the most commonly cited cases justifying criminal law’s non-intervention in 
cases of marital violence is State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453 (1868). One of the first cases using a privacy rationale to 
justify a husband’s immunity from tort liablility for assaulting his wife is Abbott v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877).  
 
5  Siegel, supra note 1, at 2134-41.   
 
6  After describing a number of nineteenth century cases upholding a domestic violence prosecution against an 
African-American man, Siegel writes that the court opinions “seem more interested in controlling African-American 
men than in protecting their wives.”  Id. at 2136.   
 
7  See id. at 2139:  
Statistics on arrests and convictions for wife beating in the late nineteenth century suggest that 
while criminal assault law was enforced against wife beaters only sporadically, it was most often 
enforced against immigrant and African-American men.  In Northern states, members of 
immigrant ethnic groups (e.g. German-and Irish-Americans) were targeted for prosecution; in the 
South, African-Americans were singled out for prosecution in numbers dramatically exceeding 
their representation in the population. 
 
8   By the 1880’s, prominent members of the American Bar Association advocated punishing wife 
beaters at the whipping post, and campaigned vigorously for legislation authorizing such a 
penalty.  Between 1876 and 1906, twelve states and the District of Columbia considered enacting 
legislation that provided for the punishment of wife beaters at the whipping post.  The bills were 
enacted in Maryland (1882), Delaware (1901), and Oregon (1906).  
Id. at 2137. 
 
9  Id. at 2153 (“As courts addressed the regulation of marital violence in the wake of chastisement’s demise, judges 
raised concerns about invading the privacy of the marriage relationship – most often, it would appear, when they 
contemplated the prospect of sanctioning wife beating in households of the middle and upper classes.”).   
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 For most of the next century, intimate violence was treated as an occasion for social 
services to be brought to bear on women.10  The problem was understood as one in which women 
provoked violence.11  When framed in this manner, the appropriate intervention became one of 
teaching women better habits to prevent their provocations.12  Within this cultural framework, 
male violence receded from view.  This notion of intimate violence as a private family dispute 
that women could be taught better skills to address extended late into the twentieth century.13   
 Due to this history of dramatic underenforcement of crimes of intimate violence against 
women, feminist activists and an influential victim’s rights movement combined their energies to 
remove the cloak of privacy from the problem of intimate violence and to put the issue on the 
public political agenda of the 1960s and 1970s.  Their efforts were tremendously successful at 
local, state, and national levels.  In relatively short order, they were able to alter the cultural 
understanding of the problem of intimate violence.14   
 Over the past three decades, battered women’s advocates have established hundreds of 
battered women’s hotlines, shelters, and victim’s advocacy programs.15  They have produced 
                                                 
10  Id. at 2170  (describing how family courts sent marital violence cases to social workers who used counseling and 
urged reconciliation). 
 
11  Id. (“Battered wives were discouraged from filing criminal charges against their husbands, urged to accept 
responsibilty for their role in provoking the violence, and encouraged to remain in the relationship...”).   
 
12  See Evan Stark, Re-presenting Woman Battering: From Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. 
L. REV. 973, 991 (describing how family courts treated cases involving “domestic trouble” as occasions for teaching 
wives better household habits). 
 
13  Siegel, supra note 1, at 2170 (“The criminal justice system regulated marital violence in this ‘therapeutic’ 
framework for much of the twentieth century.”).  
 
14  Elizabeth Schneider, an attorney and activist who was involved with the feminist communities spearheading these 
efforts, describes this groundbreaking work in ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST 
LAWMAKING (2000).   
 
15  The first shelter for battered women was opened in 1972 in Chiswick, England.  See R. Emerson Dobash and 
Russell P. Dobash, Research As Social Action: The Struggle for Battered Women, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON 
WIFE ABUSE 51, 52 (Kerstie Yllö & Michele Bograd eds. 1988) [hereinafter FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES].  The first 
shelter for battered women in the United States was established in 1974 in St. Paul, Minnesota.  See SUSAN 
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documentaries about battered women’s experiences,16 generated a cross-disciplinary professional 
literature on the subject,17 and in some instances, pioneered treatment programs for batterers.18  
Medical schools have added coursework about domestic violence to standard medical training,19 
and a number of law schools now offer both classroom courses examining issues of domestic 
violence and clinical programs in which student-attorneys provide legal representation for 
battered women.20  These extraordinary efforts have both reflected and promoted a growing 
cultural awareness of the nature, scope, and severity of the problem of violence between intimate 
partners.   
                                                                                                                                                             
SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 
(Boston: South End Press 1982).  By 1987, there were more than 700 shelters in the United States.  See R. CHEROW-
O’LEARY, THE STATE-BY STATE GUIDE TO WOMEN’S LEGAL RIGHTS 33 (1987). 
 
16  See infra notes 115, 128 and accompanying text.  
 
17  For a sampling of medical literature on domestic violence, see Jean Abbott et. al., Domestic Violence Against 
Women: Incidence and Prevalence in an Emergency Department Population, 273 JAMA 1763 (1995); American 
Psychiatric Ass’n, Position Statement on Domestic Violence Against Women, 151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 630 (1994); 
Mary Brendtro & Lee H. Bowker, Battered Women: How Can Nurses Help?, 10 ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH 
NURSING 169 (1989); Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Ass’n, Physicians and Domestic 
Violence: Ethical Considerations, 267 JAMA 3190 (1992); Susan M. Hadley, Working with Battered Women in the 
Emergency Department: A Model Program, 18 J. EMERGENCY NURSING 18 (1992); Nancy S. Jecker, Privacy Beliefs 
and the Violent Family: Extending the Ethical Argument for Physician Intervention, 269 JAMA 776 (1993); Laura 
Kroll, AMA Family Violence Campaign, 269 JAMA 1875 (1993); Marti T. Loring & Roger W. Smith, Health Care 
Barriers and Interventions for Battered Women, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES (May 1994), reprinted 
in 109(3) PUBLIC HEALTH REP. QJA 328-38 (May-June 1994); Special Edition, Domestic Violence, 267 JAMA 3113 
(1992); Nancy K. Sugg & Thomas Inui, Primary Care Physicians’ Response to Domestic Violence: Opening 
Pandora’s Box, 267 JAMA 3157 (1992); Virginia P. Tilden, Response of the Health Care Delivery System to 
Battered Women, 10 ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 309 (1989); Doctors are Advised to Screen Women for 
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1992, at A26 (reporting AMA advice to doctors to screen women patients for abuse as 
a routine matter due to prevalence of domestic violence.).   
 
18  See, e.g., David Adams, Treatment Models of Men Who Batter: A Profeminist Analysis in FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 15, at 176.  
 
19  See Teri Randall, ACOG Renews Domestic Violence Campaign, Calls for Changes in Medical School Curricula, 
267 JAMA 3131 (1992).  Attorney Mirtha Merryman reports that Boston University School of Medicine has a four 
year curriculum for medical students on family violence.  Mithra Merryman, A Survey of Domestic Violence 
Programs in Legal Education, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 383, 392 n.43 (1993).   
 
20  Id. (surveying domestic violence curricula in law schools). 
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 These changing cultural attitudes have wrought many changes in law, particularly on the 
front lines of law enforcement.  Many of these changes have involved toughening the criminal 
laws regarding violence between intimates, and educating both law enforcement and judicial 
officials about the nature of the problem and the use of criminal laws to respond to it.  Although 
the criminal justice system has been the primary locus of legal change on this issue, it has not 
been the exclusive one.   
 
II. Contemporary Legal Interventions 
 A variety of legal reforms have been undertaken to improve the responsiveness of law 
enforcement systems to victims of intimate abuse.  Legal commentators have characterized 
domestic violence not just as a crime, but as a violation of human rights21, hate crime statutes22, 
and the prohibition on involuntary servitude found in the Thirteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.23  Consequently, courts have been deluged in recent years with a variety of 
kinds of cases brought on behalf of domestic violence victims.   
 A. Civil Protection Orders 
 The major way in which courts now seek to address the danger posed by intimate 
violence is through the provision of a process by which those who have suffered violence may 
obtain civil orders of protection, also known as restraining orders, against their batterers.  Every 
                                                 
21  See, e.g., Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291 (1994); Katherine M. Culliton, Finding a Mechanism to Enforce Women’s Right to 
State Protection from Domestic Violence in the Americas, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 507 (1993); Renee Holt, Women’s 
Rights and International Law: The Struggle for Recognition and Enforcememt, 1 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 117 
(1994); Dorothy Q. Thomas & Michele E. Easley, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue, 58 ALB. L. REV. 
1119 (1995).  
 
22  See, e.g., LOIS COPELAND & LESLIE R. WOLFE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AS BIASED-MOTIVATED HATE 
CRIME: DEFINING THE ISSUES (1991). 
 
23  See Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992).   
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American jurisdiction now has legislation by which courts can issue such orders to enjoin a 
batterer’s abuse and threats.24  Different states have different procedural requirements by which 
victims may invoke the civil protection order process.25  
 Obviously, the effectiveness of the civil protection order process depends on how readily 
a victim of violence can access it, and how willing local criminal justice officials will be to 
enforce it.26  Both of these are questions of resources.  Jurisdictions vary as to how much 
outreach is provided to victims of intimate violence to assist them in using this process and in 
how many law enforcement resources are directed toward responding to it.27  These are 
significant issues, as in some instances, the holder of a restraining order faces retaliatory actions 
and an escalation of intimate violence.28 
                                                 
24  See Peter Finn and Sarah Colson, Civil Protection Orders: Legislation, Current Court Practice, and 
Enforcement, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, March 1990. 
 
25  These different requirements are described in Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection 
for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993); Kit Kinports & 
Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the 
Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & THE LAW 163 (1993).  
 
26  ADELE HARRIS AND BARBARA E. SMITH, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic Violence Victims, in DO 
ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 214 (E.S. Buzawa and C.G. Buzawa, eds. 1996) [hereinafter ARRESTS 
AND RESTRAINING ORDERS].  Cf. Andrew R. Klein, Re-Abuse in a Population of Court-Restrained Male Batterers: 
Why Restraining Orders Don’t Work, id., at 192.  ).  The Violence Against Women Act of 2000 provides 
mechanisms for the interstate enforcement of protection orders.  See 18 U.S.C.sec. 2265 (2000). 
  
27  See Karla Fischer & Mary Rose, “When Enough Is Enough” Battered Women’s Decision Making Around Court 
Orders of Protection, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 414 (1995).  A number of cities have received federal grant money in 
recent years to set up “one-stop shopping centers” for domestic violence victims, partnering law enforcement with 
social services agencies such that battered women can receive assistance from police, prosecutors, counselors, and 
medical personnel in a single location.  In a number of these cities, police are empowered to obtain emergency 
protective orders for women almost instantaneously.  See, e.g., Andrew Becker, Agencies Tout ‘One-Stop’ Services 
for Victims of Violence, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 2004, at A17. 
 
28  See CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW 499 (Foundation Press 
2001) (“[A]ll of us who read the papers also know the stories of women who have died at the hands of their abusers 
despite, and sometimes apparently because of the restraining orders they secured.”)  These attacks are one example 
of what Martha Mahoney would call “separation assault.” See Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: 
Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
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 Most states have enacted statutes criminalizing the violation of a restraining order, and 
others use criminal contempt laws to bolster the protection that a restraining order--a mere piece 
of paper--can provide.29  In these jurisdictions, the restraining order process provides formal 
notice to the abuser that continued coercive contact with the person who obtained the order can 
be prosecuted as a crime. Although the crime is defined and punished in various ways depending 
on the jurisdiction, it has often been made a felony carrying risk of years of imprisonment and 
significant collateral consequences.30   
 B. Arrest and Prosecution 
 Beyond the prosecution of violations of civil restraining orders, legal reforms have 
resulted in dramatic increases in the arrest and prosecution of batterers for the assaults and the 
batteries that they have committed.  Some states prosecute intimate violence under their general 
laws against assaultive behavior, while others have enacted separate statutes with separate 
penalties for crimes of intimate violence.31  States have also enacted statutes that define new 
crimes related to the circumstances of intimate violence.  For example, every jurisdiction 
adopted an anti-stalking law in the 1990s.32  While the first such statutes faced constitutional 
challenges due to the breadth and vagueness of the conduct they covered, newer anti-stalking 
                                                 
29  See David M. Zlotnick, Empowering the Battered Woman: The Use of Criminal Contempt Sanctions to Enforce 
Civil Protection Orders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153 (1995). 
 
30  See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases:  Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, 
Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3 (1999). 
 
31  See Barbara Hart, State Codes on Domestic Violence: Analysis, Commentary, and Recommendations, 1992 
JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JOURNAL 3 (1992).  Minnesota and California are examples of states that have 
enacted separate statutes defining a crime and a penalty specifically for domestic abuse.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
518B.01 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997); CALIF. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (2000). 
 
32  See Carol E. Jordan, Karen Quinn, Bradley Jordan & Celia R. Daileader, Stalking: Cultural, Clinical, and Legal 
Considerations, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 513 (2000).   
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legislation benefited from the more precisely worded model statute drafted in 1993 by the United 
States Department of Justice and other federal agencies.33   
 In most jurisdictions, the general rule is that police officers are forbidden to make arrests 
for misdemeanor offenses unless they first obtain an arrest warrant.34  Battered women’s 
advocates worked to change this general policy, such that now most jurisdictions have statutes 
that permit arrests for the misdemeanor of assault and battery in domestic violence cases to be 
made without warrants.35  Some locales also have mandatory domestic violence training for law 
enforcement officers.36      
 In responding to reports of intimate violence, police in some jurisdictions are permitted to 
exercise their discretion in making arrests, while other jurisdictions have removed that discretion.  
                                                 
33  Project to Develop a Model Anti-Stalking Code for the States: A Research Report, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF 
JUSTICE (October 1993).  The Model Statute defines stalking as follows: 
Any person who: 
(a) purposefully engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would 
cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury to himself or herself or a member of his or 
her immediate family or to fear the death of himself or herself or a member of his or her 
immediate family; and 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person will be placed in 
reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate 
family or will be placed in reasonable fear of the death of himself or herself or a member 
of his or her immediate family; and 
(c) whose acts induce fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or herself or a 
member of his or her immediate family or induce fear in the specific person of the death 
of himself or herself or a member of his or her immediate family; 
is guilty of stalking.   
Id. at 43-44.  
 
34  Nancy James, Domestic Violence: A History of Arrest Policies and A Survey of Modern Laws, 28 FAM. L.Q. 509 
(1994). 
 
35  See Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CRIM. LAW & 
CRIMINOLOGY 46 (1992).  
 
36  See infra note 134 and accompanying text.  See also Casey G. Guinn and, Sgt. Anne O’Dell, Stopping the 
Violence: The Role of the Police Officer and the Prosecutor, 20 WEST. ST. U. L. REV. 297 (1993).  For examples of 
statutes that require domestic violence training for law enforcement, see ALASKA STAT. § 18.65.240 (Michie 2002); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519 (West 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-29g (West 1999); D. C. CODE ANN. § 16-
1034 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.1701 (West 2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.784 (Michie Supp. 2002); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 116A (2002): N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-20 (West Supp. 2003); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 642(5) 
(McKinney 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-29-6 (2002).  The Violence Against Women Act of 2000 earmarks funds 
for grants to support such training programs.  See 42 U.S.C. 3796gg(b) (2000). 
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The 1984 publication of an experiment with mandatory arrest in Minneapolis spurred a number 
of states to adopt mandatory arrest statutes or policies.37  These require police officers to arrest 
domestic violence suspects whenever the officers have probable cause to believe that a crime 
such as assault or battery has been committed.  Other states have preferred arrest laws in these 
situations.38   
 Some jurisdictions have mandatory prosecution policies as well, such that prosecutors 
have no discretion to dismiss domestic violence charges once they are filed.39  Even if the victim 
of the crime requests that the charges be dismissed and refuses to cooperate in pressing the 
charges, the prosecutor will be required to pursue the case nonetheless.  In addition, most states 
have mandatory reporting laws that require medical professionals, and occasionally other social 
services workers, to file reports with police whenever they suspect that a patient’s symptoms or 
injuries are caused by intimate violence.40   
 Mandatory reporting, arrest, and prosecution are legal reforms intended to counter the 
long and notorious history of law enforcement’s failure to respond to victims of intimate 
violence.  Supporters of mandatory legal interventions believe that they provide powerful 
deterrents to batterers, demonstrating strong cultural condemnation of battering behavior and 
                                                 
37  Lawrence W. Sherman and Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 
AM. SOC. REV. 261 (1984).  Lawrence Sherman, co-author of the first influential study on mandatory arrest has 
since urged the repeal of mandatory arrest laws.  See Janell D. Schmidt and Lawrence W. Sherman, Does Arrest 
Deter Domestic Violence? in ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS, supra note 26, at 43. 
 
38  In 1977, the state of Oregon enacted the first mandatory arrest law, requiring an arrest when police had probable 
cause to believe that a crime of domestic violence had occurred.  By the early 1990s, many other states had followed 
suit.  Some states simply encouraged rather than required police officers to make arrests in these situations.  See 
DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 28, at 595.  The Violence Against Women Act of 2000 provides monetary grants 
for programs that require and encourage batterers’ arrests.  See 42 U.S.C.3793 (2000). 
 
39  See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1850 (1996). 
 
40  See Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
550 (1990). 
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reducing the likelihood of discriminatory law enforcement.  Therefore they consider these 
policies the most effective available tool for reducing intimate violence.41 
 By contrast, opponents of mandatory interventions are deeply concerned when decisions 
to arrest and prosecute intimate violence are made without regard to the victim’s wishes.42  They 
are concerned that especially when victims remain in relationship with abusers, as many do, 
mandatory criminal justice interventions can be harmful to the victim in a number of ways.  
These harms are compounded for women who come from communities with historically troubled 
relationships with law enforcement, immigrant women whose batterers may be deported, and 
women living on the edge of poverty.43  Moreover, researchers are in dispute as to the long-term 
effectiveness of mandatory policies in reducing intimate violence.44   
 A criminal conviction for a crime of domestic violence may in some instances result not 
in immediate incarceration, but in a sentence of probation with required conditions.45  These 
conditions, enforced through the threat of future imprisonment for failure to comply, often 
require that the batterer enter individual counseling, an anger-management program, or other 
                                                 
41  See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 39, at 1886; Forum: Mandatory Prosecution in Domestic Violence Cases, 7 UCLA 
WOMEN’S L.J. 169 (1997); Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest of Batterers: A Reply to its Critics, in ARRESTS AND 
RESTRAINING ORDERS, supra note 26, at 115; Guinn and O’Dell, supra note 36; Joan Zorza, Must We Stop Arresting 
Batterers?: Analysis and Policy Implications of New Police Domestic Violence Studies, 28 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 929 
(1994).  
 
42  Linda Mills articulates this perspective.  See Mills, supra note 40.  
 
43  See, e.g., Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class and the Politics of the Battered 
Women’s Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281 (1997); Miriam H. Ruttenberg, A Feminist Critique of 
Mandatory Arrest: An Analysis of Race and Gender in Domestic Violence Policy, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 171 
(1994); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women 
of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1993). See also Klein & Orloff, supra note 25.  
 
44  See Symposium on Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1992); Zorza, supra note 41.   
 
45  See Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WILLIAM & 
MARY LAW REV. 1505 (1998).   
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available social services.46  In some jurisdictions, such as Boston, Seattle, and San Diego, there 
are therapeutic programs to which convicted batterers can be sentenced that are designed 
exclusively to treat men who perpetrate intimate violence.47   
 Some commentators argue that encouraging and facilitating the use of therapeutic 
services in domestic violence cases would be more effective than mandating their use through 
the criminal justice system.  They worry that the coercive qualities of criminal penalties impede 
the effectiveness of these services.48  Others suggest that in some cases providing intimate 
violence victims with the material resources that many of them lack, such as independent 
housing and income, may be preferable to policies of punishing abusers through criminal justice 
sanctions.49   
 While these controversies about the appropriateness of various kinds of legal 
interventions continue, there is no doubt that prosecutions of domestic violence cases have 
become features of the landscape in criminal courtrooms around the country.  Some criminal 
courthouses hold specialized domestic violence sessions, and a handful of jurisdictions have 
established a court devoted exclusively to domestic violence.50  The underlying rationale for the 
latter arrangement is that specialized domestic violence courts, overseeing all related civil and 
criminal matters, will more effectively address the complex issues -- potentially involving 
                                                 
46  See, e.g., Adams, supra note 18. See also Adele Harrell, Evaluation of Court-Ordered Treatment for Domestic 
Violence Offenders, STATE JUSTICE INST. 99 (1991).   
 
47  Barry D. Rosenfeld, Court-Ordered Treatment of Spouse Abuse, 12 CLIN. PSYCH. REV. 205 (1992).   
 
48  See Linda G. Mills, supra note 40. 
 
49  Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1009 (2000).  
 
50  See S. Keilitz, H. Efkeman and P. Casey, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS: JURISDICTION, ORGANIZATION, 
PERFORMANCE GOALS, AND MEASURES (National Center for State Courts, 1997).  
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divorce, property, child custody, and other issues -- that may be implicated when efforts are 
underway to end an abusive relationship. 
 C. Civil Lawsuits 
 While far less common than criminal prosecutions, some victims of intimate violence 
have filed civil lawsuits, known as tort actions, against their abusers.  Through these lawsuits, 
plaintiffs seek monetary compensation for the harms that they have suffered due to the 
defendants’ abusive behavior.51  The harms compensated need not be physical injuries alone, but 
might include the traumatic consequences of living under the coercive control of one’s intimate 
partner.  Many jurisdictions recognize a tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and some commentators have suggested that claims based on this legal theory might be used as a 
source of redress for victims of intimate abuse in conjunction with tort actions for physical harms 
such as assault and battery.52   
 Tort actions as a source of redress in these situations have some obvious constraints.  
First, victims will need the assistance of lawyers to pursue such actions, and there is a profound 
shortage of lawyers for those who are unable to pay for their services.  Second, a batterer without 
sufficient financial means may be unable to pay a monetary judgment, if it is imposed.  
Therefore, even in situations where plaintiffs are able to hire lawyers to file such suits and their 
claims are upheld by courts, the victories will be merely symbolic unless the defendants have 
significant resources.  Hence, the deterrence picture provided by this legal remedy is a limited 
one, although there may be some individual cases where it is a viable avenue of redress. 
                                                 
51  See Douglas D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 43 S.C. L. REV. 543 (1992).  The 
provision of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 that made gender-motivated crimes of violence the basis for 
a federal civil lawsuit was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) which held that Congress lacked constitutional authority to enact such a remedy.   
 
52  Id. See also Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and Possibilities, 31 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 319 (1997).  
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 Another kind of civil lawsuit that does not depend for its success on the resources of an 
individual defendant is a lawsuit against police departments and municipalities, alleging civil 
rights violations in the failure of police officers to respond to complaints of intimate violence.  
Evidence that the police had policies or practices of non-intervention in domestic violence cases 
led to a number of prominent lawsuits and multi-million dollar judgments in the 1980s.53  The 
prospect of liability at this level of financial magnitude encouraged police departments to 
increase their responsiveness to victims of intimate violence.  Indeed, the fear of liability may 
well have led some communities to favor mandatory arrest programs.54   
 A 1989 Supreme Court decision known as DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department 
of Social Services seems to prohibit lawsuits against police departments and municipalities for 
failure to protect victims from private violence that the police could not control.55  Nonetheless, a 
plaintiff may still be able to prevail in such litigation on a claim that police enabled private 
violence56 or engaged in discriminatory enforcement.57  Although lawsuits of this sort may be 
                                                 
53  The most prominent case was Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) (federal jury 
found police liable for negligence in failing to respond to plaintiff’s repeated requests for protection from her 
abusive husband, awarding her $2.3 million in compensation for her injuries.)  Other related cases include Hynson v. 
Chester, 864 F.2d 1026 (3rd Cir. 1988) (mother and children of woman killed by boyfriend permitted to sue police 
for refusing to arrest boyfriend before murder because restraining order had expired); Watson v. Kansas City, 857 
F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988) (police department can be liable for failing to take action against abusive husband who was 
a police officer, resulting in an attack on his wife and children).   
 
54  See Dalton & Schneider, supra note 28, at 595. 
 
55  DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).  
 
56  Caitlin E. Borgmann, Battered Women’s Substantive Due Process Claims: Can Orders of Protection Deflect 
DeShaney?, 65 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1280 (1990).  
 
57  George P. Choundas, Neither Equal Nor Protected: The Invisible Law of Equal Protection, The Legal Invisibility 
of Its Gender-Based Victims, 44 EMORY L.J. 1069 (1995).  See, e.g., Estate of Macias v. Ihde, 219 F.3d 1018 (9th 
Cir. 2000) which permitted a civil lawsuit against a sheriff’s department following a domestic violence homicide on 
the grounds that the plaintiff had a constitutional right to police services administered in a nondiscriminatory 
manner.  Following this decision, the Sheriff’s Office of Sonoma County, California settled the lawsuit for $1 
million dollars rather than face trial for its failure to provide requested assistance to a woman threatened by her 
batterer. 
 
 13
advisable in particular situations, they are not a feasible approach in most cases of intimate 
violence.   
 D. Alternative Forms of Dispute Resolution 
 In cases involving family law, many courts prefer mediation as an alternative to 
litigation.  This preference for mediation is sparked by a desire to reduce both case congestion 
and levels of antagonism in matters related to the family.  Indeed, a number of states require 
mediation in cases involving child custody and visitation.58   
 The preference for mediation is controversial in cases involving intimate violence.  Those 
who oppose mediation in cases of intimate violence argue that the posture of mediator neutrality 
prevents the mediator from giving the abused partner the support that she may need and inhibits 
any signaling of disapproval of the batterer’s behavior.  Consequently, mediation opponents fear 
that the ethos of mediation is such that it enables the batterer—and, even worse, the system--to 
overlook the extent of the harm that the batterer has inflicted and to avoid taking it into account 
in reaching agreements.59   
 Supporters of mediation in at least some of the cases involving intimate violence believe 
that many of the opponents’ concerns can be addressed through the manner in which the 
mediation setting is structured.  The mediator can meet separately with the parties and can 
encourage the batterer to take responsibility for his behavior.  The lessened adversariness of the 
                                                 
58  See Holly Joyce, Mediation and Domestic Violence: Legislative Responses, 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 447 
(1997) (discussing many state statutes). 
 
59  See, e.g., Karla Fischer, Neil Vidmar, & René Ellis, The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in 
Domestic Violence Cases, 46 S.M.U.L. REV. 2117 (1993); Sara Cobb, The Domestication of Violence in Mediation, 
31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 397, 410 (1997).  
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mediation process is characterized as more potentially empowering to the battered woman than 
the formality of the courtroom setting. 60 
 The controversies concerning the appropriateness of mediation in cases that entail 
intimate violence have influenced the legal regulation of access to mediation.  Some of the 
jurisdictions that mandate mediation relinquish that requirement in cases where intimate violence 
has occurred.  Some jurisdictions go so far as to ban mediation in these cases, whereas others 
permit the judge to make a discretionary judgment concerning the appropriateness of mediation 
in a particular case.61   
 Mediation is not the only potential alternative setting for resolving disputes in cases that 
involve intimate violence.  Donna Coker has described the Navajo practice of Peacemaking as a 
kind of forum that may provide assistance to battered women in some circumstances.  
Peacemaking processes may be initiated by the battered woman or by referral from the Navajo 
legal system.  The peacemaker facilitates a conversation between the parties, those with a stake 
in the parties’ lives, such as family and friends, and those with special expertise related to the 
pertinent issues.  The group then works to try to create a plan for addressing the problem.62  This 
kind of model has been adopted by proponents of restorative justice programs, some of whom 
believe that these represent promising alternative interventions for at least a portion of the cases 
involving intimate violence.63   
                                                 
60  See, e.g., Joyce, supra note 58, at 456-58.   
 
61  See KATHERINE T. BARTLETT, ANGELA P. HARRIS, & DEBORAH L. RHODE, GENDER & LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, 
COMMENTARY 650 (3d ed. 2002). 
 
62  Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
1, 34-37 (1999).  
 
63  Linda Mills proposes use of a restorative justice model as an alternative to a criminal justice model to address 
problems of intimate violence. See LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE 
ABUSE (2003).  
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III. Self-Defense 
 Against the backdrop of the centuries-old reluctance to address the problem of intimate 
violence, all of these developments in the law were hard won and recently so.  Nevertheless, 
attitudes often change more slowly than the law.  As battered women’s advocates have observed, 
legal decisionmakers’ perceptions of battered women are often still plagued by stereotypes and 
misperceptions.64  These problems manifest themselves acutely when the legal interventions 
detailed in Part II have not succeeded in preventing intimate violence, and battered women find 
themselves on trial for killing their abusers.   
 In an intimate relationship that becomes violent, the violence may become lethal.  When 
it does so, the violence in the relationship has generally escalated to the extent that the abuser in 
the relationship kills the abused.  Studies show that approximately one-third of female murder 
victims, compared to one-twenty-fifth of male murder victims, are killed by their intimate 
partners.65 
 Occasionally, lethality runs in the opposite direction than the pattern of abuse, such that a 
person who has suffered repeated and severe violence at the hands of her intimate partner 
responds by killing her batterer.  Often these killings are charged as crimes, ranging from 
manslaughter to first-degree murder.  A third of the women incarcerated for homicide have been 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
64  See, e.g., Martha Mahoney, supra note 28, at 24-26 (1991) (describing stereotypical notions of women’s 
experience that the term “battered woman” implies); Michael Dowd, Dispelling the Myths about the “Battered 
Woman’s Defense”: Towards a New Understanding, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 581 (1992) (describing images of 
“good” battered women and “bad” battered women that have emerged).  
 
65  See Callie Marie Rennison, Intimate Partner Violence, 1993-2001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (February, 
2003). 
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convicted for killing an intimate partner.  Research shows that a considerable percentage of these 
partners had histories of abusing the women who killed them.66   
 In such cases, the likely defense is self-defense.  To meet the criteria of self-defense and 
thereby avoid conviction for acts of violence against a batterer, a defendant must convince a jury 
that she acted from a reasonable belief that she was in imminent danger of serious bodily harm or 
death.67  In other words, self-defense in this context entails a claim that the intimate violence had 
reached a point at which either the abuser or the abused would be maimed or killed.  Stated more 
plainly, when the abused, now a criminal defendant, took the abuser’s life, she must show that 
she did so to save her own. 
 A. Battered Woman Syndrome 
 Over the past three decades, psychologists have sought to understand more clearly the 
dynamics of abusive relationships, the experiences of battered women, and the psychological 
consequences of living for an extended period in an intimate relationship with a batterer.  In the 
1970s, psychologist Lenore Walker coined the term “battered woman syndrome”, a subspecies of 
post-traumatic stress disorder, to explain the perceptions and behavior of women in such 
situations.68  Following the publication of Walker’s research, lawyers representing women 
charged with violence against their batterers saw that prosecutors, judges, and jurors might learn 
more about how the world looks to women trapped in violent relationships and might view them 
                                                 
66  See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL, 127-130 (1987).  See also Angela Browne & Kirk R. 
Williams, Exploring the Effects of Resource Availabliity and the Likelihood of Female-Perpetrated Homicides, 23 L. 
& SOC’Y. REV. 75, 78 (1989) (40% of 132 incarcerated women in Chicago were in prison for killing an abusive 
partner and all had sought help from police on at least 5 prior occasions.) For more recent data, see the website of 
the Bureau of Justice Statistics (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs) which contains considerable statistical information 
concerning crimes of intimate violence.   
 
67  See CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAW (1989).   
 
68  LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979).   
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more sympathetically if these decisionmakers were able to become better educated about 
battered women’s lives.   
 Consequently, activists and lawyers for battered women developed a trial strategy of 
seeking to admit experts who could offer testimony to educate jurors about battering 
relationships and their consequences.  Since “battered woman syndrome” had a scientific flavor, 
similar to other sorts of psychological and scientific testimony that experts were permitted to 
offer at trial, the educational process that occurred in the course of battered women’s litigation 
took the form of admitting the expert testimony of psychologists.  When permitted to testify, 
these experts would describe for the jury the nature of battered woman syndrome and explain 
how it might illuminate what occurred in the case at bar.69   
 Battered women’s lawyers believed that through the admission of expert testimony about 
battered woman syndrome, which focused on the experiences, perceptions, and mental states of 
women caught in abusive relationships, jurors could come to appreciate how the defendant 
reasonably believed that she had to use violence to repel the imminent life-threatening violence 
of her batterer.  In the absence of expert testimony, battered women’s advocates feared that the 
law of self-defense would be applied in a gender-biased fashion, since judges and jurors might 
fail to apprehend the contextual conditions of battered women’s lives.70   
 Initially, litigants’ efforts to admit expert testimony of battered woman syndrome met 
little success.  Judges often refused the admission of such testimony, disputing its relevance, its 
scientific basis, or the notion that it would assist a jury.  Battered women’s advocates responded 
with campaigns to liberalize the evidentiary rulings to more readily allow for the admission of 
                                                 
69  Elizabeth Schneider explores the strategic decisions that led to the effort to admit expert testimony at trial.  See 
Schneider, supra note 14, at 79-83.   
 
70  Id.   
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expert testimony in these cases.  These campaigns yielded statutes adopted by some state 
legislatures that authorized the admission of such testimony71 and case law from the highest court 
of many states that reached the same conclusion.72  By the end of the 1980s, the admission of 
expert testimony on battered woman syndrome had become a far more commonly accepted 
practice in trials of battered women charged with violence against batterers.   
 When expert testimony of battered woman syndrome was admitted, it did not always 
work as battered women’s advocates had hoped.  Although some women whose self-defense 
trials featured testimony about battered woman syndrome did receive acquittals or convictions of 
lesser charges, many others were convicted of the crimes with which they had been charged.73  
Some argue that this pattern of results relates to inherent limitations in the concept of battered 
woman syndrome itself. 
                                                 
71  Statutes liberalizing evidentiary standards in cases involving battered women took a variety of forms.  Some 
statutes explicitly permitted the introduction of expert testimony on “battered woman syndrome” or “battered spouse 
syndrome.” CAL. EVID. CODE §1107 (West 1995 & Supp.2003) (enacted 1991); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§10-916 (2002) (enacted 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2901.06 (West 1997) (enacted 1990) (limited to self-
defense claims); S.C. CODE ANN. §17-23-170 (LAW CO-OP. 2003) (enacted 1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. §6-1-203 
(Michie 2003) (enacted 1993) (limited to self-defense claims).   
 Other statutes allow expert testimony on the effects of domestic violence, however they avoid the “battered 
spouse syndrome” language: GA. CODE ANN. §16-3-21 (2003) (limited to self-defense claims); LA. CODE EVID. 
ANN. Art. 404 (West 1995) (enacted 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch., 233, §23F (West 2000) (enacted 1993) 
(limited to self-defense claims); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 48.061 (enacted 1993), amended by 2003 NEV. REV. STAT. 
284; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §40.7 (West 1992) (enacted 1992); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 38.36 (Vernon 
Supp. 2004) (enacted 1993) (limited to self-defense claims).   
 In comparison, other statutes have modified the standard for evaluating the defendant’s mental culpability 
in cases involving evidence of domestic abuse: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-415 (West 2001) (enacted 1992); IND. 
CODE ANN. §§35-4-1-3.3, 35-41-3-11 (Michie 1998) (enacted 1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §503.010 (Michie 1999) 
(amended 1992); UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-402(5) (1999) (amended 1994).   
 
72  Expert testimony on battering has been admitted in all 50 states in cases where battered women face trial on 
criminal charges.  Most, but not all, of these cases involved claims of self-defense.  See Dalton & Schneider, supra 
note 28, at 731. 
 
73  A 1995 study conducted by the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered Women, commissioned by 
the United States Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services, found that 63% of convictions and 
sentences of battered women defendants were upheld on appeal, even though expert testimony was admitted in 71% 
of these. See Dalton & Schneider, supra note 28, at 741. See also Browne, supra note 66, at 12, 163 (reporting only 
9 acquittals and 1 dismissal among 42 cases of women charged with killing or injuring their partners).    
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 While testimony about battered woman syndrome can be a vehicle for educating jurors 
about battered women’s relationships, perceptions, and experiences, it can also reinforce a view 
of battered women as mentally impaired.74  Commentators observe that battered woman 
syndrome focuses attention on the psychology of the battered woman rather than on the 
batterer’s pattern of coercive behavior.  As a result, new stereotypes about battered women have 
been created, such that those who fail to meet the stereotypes are perceived to be less credible 
when they claim self-defense.75  As several commentators have noted, the battered woman 
stereotype has worked to the particular disadvantage of black women, lesbians, women perceived 
to have assertive personalities, women with substance abuse histories, and others who for a 
variety of cultural reasons may not be readily perceived to embody the passive virtues that fit 
constrained understandings of the battered woman profile.76   
 Success in court has been particularly elusive for battered women defendants who raise 
self-defense in cases in which the self-protective violence that they inflicted on their batterers did 
not occur in the middle of a threatening confrontation.  Rather the violence they inflicted may 
have been during a lull in the abuse, when the batterer was sleeping or otherwise off guard.  
                                                 
74  Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert 
Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 195, 214-15 (1986) (arguing that “battered woman syndrome” can 
be seen to reinforce stereotypes of women as passive, sick, powerless, and victimized); Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing 
Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 (1994) (claiming that battered woman syndrome reinforces negative stereotypes of 
women).   
 
75  Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 121, 144-50 (1985) (noting that battered women on trial for killing their abusers do not benefit from 
expert testimony unless they fit a rigidly defined and narrowly applied definition of a battered woman).   
 
76  See Sharon A. Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspective, 1 UCLA WOMEN’S 
L.J. 191, 193-98 (1991) (arguing that stereotypes of battered women who kill their abusers as passive, emotional, 
and dependent create problems for battered black women, who are not seen as fitting this image); Linda L. Ammons, 
Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the 
Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1003 (same); Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without Circumscribing: 
Questioning the Construction of Gender in the Discourse of Intimate Violence, 64 G.W.U. L. REV. 582, 605-613 
(1996) (arguing that the narrow boundaries of the battered woman stereotype are rooted in traditional gender 
ideology and work to the particular disadvantage of women who diverge from that traditional ideology, most notably 
lesbians.) 
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While battered women’s advocates have never contended that women should kill batterers in 
these non-confrontational situations, they also suggest that it is not unreasonable in certain of 
these situations to view these women as acting in self-defense, similar in fashion to hostages 
overtaking their captors.77   
 In cases in which the battered woman defendant had previously sought aid from police, 
courts, and social services, only to find them non-responsive or ineffective in their efforts to 
protect her, a predicate may well be laid for an argument that she honestly and reasonably 
believed that she was able to protect her life from the batterer’s impending lethal violence only 
by the assaultive actions for which she is now on trial.  Indeed, decisionmakers would have no 
context within which to understand her actions and perceptions unless they heard extensive 
evidence of the violent dynamics in the relationship, the history of abuse, and prior efforts to 
escape or halt the violence.  Nevertheless, women have not fared well in cases of 
nonconfrontational assaults, likely due to fears that if the imminent harm requirement of self-
defense doctrine is stretched beyond confrontational episodes, battered women may be 
encouraged to take violent retaliatory actions, then claim self-defense.78 
 B. Problems in Representation of Battered Women as Defendants 
 Problems inherent in the interpretation and application of the concept of battered woman 
syndrome are not the only problems faced by battered women as defendants in courtrooms.  The 
failure of women who have defended their lives against their batterers to successfully defend 
                                                 
77  See, e.g., Isabel Marcus, Reframing “Domestic Violence”: Terrorism in the Home, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF 
PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC ABUSE 11 (Martha A. Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds. 1994). 
See also Jane Maslow Cohen, Regimes of Private Tyranny: What Do They Mean to Morality and for the Criminal 
Law?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 757 (1996).   
 
78  See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform 
Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 279 (1991) (observing that while women have not fared well in nonconfrontational 
self-defense cases, most of the self-defense claims arise from confrontational situations, and evidence of bias exists 
even in the latter cases).   
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themselves against criminal convictions has multiple causes.  Sometimes it is related to 
inadequate representation, a problem that pervades the criminal justice system for those without 
access to considerable financial resources.79   
 Unfortunately, it is not an aberration to find practicing in criminal courtrooms around the 
country attorneys who are unschooled in the phenomenon of domestic violence, who hold 
misconceptions or biases about battered women, or who simply lack knowledge about the 
complexities of representing battered women and lack the desire to remedy this deficit.80  Due at 
least in part to their misapprehension of the nature and the legal implications of the incidents 
underlying the charges, such attorneys may fail to effectively investigate the battered woman’s 
claim of self-defense.  They may fail to identify or interview potential defense witnesses such as 
family members or friends, to find other sources of information such as medical records or 
employment records that corroborate the defense, or to seek expert assistance to bolster an 
available defense.81   
                                                 
79  In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution guarantee a defendant the right to counsel in criminal cases . Although 
the right to counsel was presumed to mean the right to “effective” counsel, commentators argue that, due to 
underfunding and the lack of political will, the promise of effective counsel has gone largely unrealized for indigent 
defendants facing criminal charges. See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty 
Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986).   
See also Stacey L. Reed, A Look Back At Gideon v. Wainwright After Forty Years: An Examination of the Illusory 
Sixth Amendment Right to Assistance of Counsel, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 47 (2003); Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal 
Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are At Stake, 1997 ANN. 
SURVEY AM. LAW 783 (1997).    
 
80  
From the number of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on faulty advice regarding 
plea bargains or the defendant testifying, and on attorney failure to present evidence and testimony 
that could have assisted the jury to understand and eradicate the very same misconceptions 
apparently held by counsel, it is apparent that attorneys are susceptible to misconceptions about 
battered women. 
Schneider, supra note 14, at 145.   
 
81  An examination of post-conviction cases in which battered women appeal their convictions or sentences on the 
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel reveals a variety of shortcomings in battered women’s trial 
representation.  Twenty–six of these cases are annotated at Gregory G. Sarno, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: 
Battered Spouse Syndrome As Defense to Homicide or Other Criminal Offense, 18 A.L.R. 5th 871 (1994).   
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 Attorneys who are not fully aware of the story of abuse that underlies the current charges 
may permit a biased jury to decide the case.  This can happen when an attorney fails to properly 
question prospective jurors, through a procedure known as voir dire, about the misperceptions 
that they may hold of battered women.82  It can also happen when the attorney fails to challenge 
the selection of jurors who reveal such biases.  These attorneys may also fail to request that 
judges instruct jurors on how credible evidence of battering relates to a claim of self-defense.83  
In addition, attorneys may fail to develop relationships of trust with their clients, which when 
combined with the confusion and memory lapses that frequently plague battered women who 
have used lethal violence, may lead them to give poor advice to their clients regarding decisions 
to accept a plea bargain or to testify at trial.84   
 Despite the fact that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees 
the effective assistance of counsel at a criminal trial, the Supreme Court has made it exceedingly 
difficult to overturn a conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance.85  This is so even when 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
82  For a proposed set of voir dire questions designed to address these misperceptions, see Liza Lawrence and Lisa 
Kugler, Selected Voir Dire Questions, WOMEN’S SELF-DEFENSE CASES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 256 (E. Bochnak, 
ed. 1981).   
 
83  See Schneider, supra note 14, at 145 (“Cases involving claims of ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure 
to offer jury instruction on battering suggest that many attorneys lack knowledge about the particular complexities 
of representing battered women.”).    
 
84  A number of appeals by battered women concerning ineffective assistance of counsel at trial raise claims of 
inadequate advice, particularly relating to plea-bargaining or testifying. See, e.g., State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 
220 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Scott, 1989 WL 90613 (Rel. Super. 1989); Larson v. State, 766 P.2d 261 
(Nev. 1988); State v. Gfeller, 1987 WL 14328 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). See also Judith McMorrow, The Power and 
Limits of Legal Naming: A Case Study of “Battered Women Syndrome,” in THE EYES OF JUSTICE 217, 224 (Roberta 
Kevelson ed. 1993) (describing memory problems as a consequence of battering that can impair communication of 
those consequences).   
 
85  The United States Supreme Court established the standard of ineffective assistance as defective representation, 
unsupported by reason or tactics, that prejudices the defendant. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1983).  
The case sets a high burden for proof of these elements by establishing a presumption of reasonably effective 
assistance, even in cases in which the attorney’s performance appears to be unreasonable or shoddy, and making it 
difficult for defendants to establish that their attorneys’ errors caused the outcome of the case. 
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there is substantial evidence of significant inadequacies in representation.  In a number of 
appellate cases, courts have refused to find that the ineffective assistance of trial counsel rose to 
the level of a constitutional violation, although counsel failed to develop a full evidentiary record 
of the history of battering in the defendant’s relationship with a violent partner.86   
 C. Problems of Judge and Juror Bias 
 In addition to receiving inadequate representation, women raising self-defense claims 
have sometimes met judicial hostility.  Judges unsympathetic to defendants generally, or to 
women raising self-defense claims in particular, have sometimes refused to admit evidence, 
expert or otherwise, proffered in support of self-defense on the grounds that it is not relevant or 
would not be helpful to the jury.  In some instances, judges have refused to permit questioning of 
prospective jurors during the voir dire process to uncover specific attitudes that may bias them 
against a claim of self-defense in these circumstances.  Judges may also refuse to instruct juries 
to consider self-defense in these cases.87   
 Recent case law and legislation in a number of jurisdictions requires the admission of 
evidence bearing on self-defense when a factual predicate can be established that the defendant 
on trial suffered a history of abuse at the hands of the person she is charged with assaulting or 
killing.88  Nevertheless, judicial hostility remains an obstacle to fair trials in some instances, as 
judges still retain considerable discretionary authority over the presentation of evidence.   
After a careful study of appellate cases concerning battered women’s claims of self-defense, 
Professor Holly Maguigan concluded that the major obstacle to fair trials in these cases is error 
                                                 
86  See, e.g., State v. Zimmerman, 823 S.W.2d 220 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); Martin v. State, 501 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Commonwealth v. Stonehouse, 555 A2d 772 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989); Commonwealth v. Miller, 
634 A.2d 614(Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); People v. Day, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).   
 
87  See, e.g., State v. Norman, 378 S.E. 2d 8 (N.C. 1989).   
 
88  See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.   
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by the trial court judge in the application of self-defense doctrine to the evidence that the defense 
presents.89   
 If the trial judges in these cases do not instruct jurors properly on self-defense, the jurors 
will be unable to determine the appropriate legal relevance of any evidence that the defense has 
been able to present.  Yet even in the absence of judicial error or hostility, when jurors receive 
the evidence and are fairly instructed about how to consider it as bearing on self-defense, some 
juries, for a variety of reasons, reject it.  Especially in situations of inadequate defense 
representation, these reasons may include the jurors’ misconceptions of the nature of the abuse 
and its consequences, which in turn may lead them to misinterpret as aggression or retaliation the 
self-defensive violence for which the battered woman is now on trial.90   
 After conviction, women in these circumstances may face severe penalties, ranging from 
a term of years, to life in prison with or without parole, to the death sentence.  Sometimes the 
jurisdiction’s statutory structure is set up such that the judge has no discretion about the sentence 
imposed after conviction on particular charges.  In other circumstances, judges who have 
sentencing discretion and who harbor misconceptions of battered women’s situations have 
exercised it harshly.91  An unduly stiff sentence imposed by a judge may result from inadequate 
defense representation, bias, or other factors that block the judge’s apprehension of the 
mitigating features of the underlying events that were the subject of the trial.  The penalties 
                                                 
89  Maguigan, supra note 78, at 457-58.   
 
90  See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. Of course, jurors will be aided in their rejection of self-defense by 
a prosecutor who urges them to reach that conclusion. 
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flowing from conviction involve not just the potential loss of life or liberty, but other serious 
collateral consequences such as the loss of custody of children, future employment opportunities, 
and the right to vote.92   
 
IV. The Emergence of Clemency Projects  
 The nationwide difficulties that battered women encountered in receiving fair hearings on 
self-defense claims spawned another legal reform effort to address this injustice.  In the 1990s, 
regional women’s groups organized clemency projects around the country to seek a reduction in 
the penalties that battered women suffered after they were convicted of crimes against their 
batterers.93  While the clemency movement has not concerned itself exclusively with battered 
women convicted of homicide, these are the cases to which the movement devoted its primary 
attention.  Aided by the clemency projects, women imprisoned for killing their batterers sought 
executive clemency.   
 A. The Nature of Executive Clemency 
 Executive clemency refers to the discretionary power of the President of the United 
States or the governor of a state to reduce the severity of a criminal sentence.  Clemency implies 
mercy, the application of a kind of forbearance or forgiveness of an unduly harsh sanction.94  
While a form of executive clemency has existed since ancient times and can be found in virtually 
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every country’s legal system,95 the prerogative to provide sentence relief on the part of the 
executive branches of state or federal governments is rooted in their respective constitutions.96 
 The clemency process as a means of ameliorating unduly harsh penalties varies from 
state to state.  In many states, an advisory board, most frequently the state’s parole board, 
considers petitions for clemency, gathers information to investigate the petitions, holds hearings 
in some instances, and makes recommendations to the governor about whether a pardon—
signifying full absolution for the crime—or a commutation—signifying a reduction in 
sentence—should be granted.97  Although they typically have independent decisionmaking 
authority, governors tend to heed the advice of their advisory boards.  In a few states, a 
governor’s decision to grant clemency may need to be approved by another administrative body 
as well.  In Massachusetts, this body is called the Governor’s Council, established as a check on 
gubernatorial power.98   
 Battered women who have petitioned for relief through the clemency process have rarely 
sought full pardons.  Although the assertion in a clemency petition that a claim of self-defense 
was erroneously denied at trial establishes a legitimate ground for a pardon, battered women 
incarcerated for homicide, after making pragmatic assessments of the relative probabilities of 
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success, have generally sought to have their sentences commuted, or reduced in duration.  In 
these instances, the petitioners were seeking recognition that the self-defensive aspects of their 
cases established the mitigating grounds for sentence relief.   
 From the petitioner’s perspective, receiving a full pardon is a preferable remedy, in that it 
results in the petitioner’s immediate release from prison as well as the erasure of the conviction 
and its attendant collateral disabilities. Nevertheless, a commutation provides substantial relief, 
as it can reduce a sentence to time served.  In other words, receiving a commutation can also 
result in the petitioner’s immediate release from prison—often the primary concern of the 
petitioner—even though in such an instance the conviction remains standing.  Perceiving 
commutations to be more politically feasible and realizing that they too can result in grants of 
freedom from further incarceration, the battered women’s clemency movement has focused 
primarily on sentence commutations.99 
 A request for a sentence commutation was especially compelling in a case where self-
defense had not been asserted as well as it might have been at trial or where it had encountered 
some apparent bias on the part of the judge or jury.  Another compelling feature of clemency 
claims was that many of the incarcerated women faced trial before cultural understandings about 
the lives of battered women had evolved, before significant services had been made available to 
them, and before legal reforms responsive to their situations had been incorporated.  This was 
easily demonstrated in jurisdictions in which the incarcerated women were convicted prior to the 
enactment of laws that permitted the admission of expert testimony regarding battered woman 
syndrome and of other types of evidence corroborating the extent and duration of the abuse the 
defendants had suffered at the hands of their batterers.  Since these legal reforms were 
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prospective in nature, applying only to cases not yet finalized, those already serving sentences 
had not received the more enlightened legal treatment that they would have received had their 
cases arisen later.  Hence, sentence commutations came to be perceived as a form of equitable 
relief that substituted for the inability to retroactively apply legal reforms.100   
 B. The Ohio Experience: Leadership in Action 
 In the 1980s, issues of domestic violence were something of a cause celebre for 
Governor Richard F. Celeste of Ohio, whose wife Dagmar had worked on these issues in the 
feminist community in Cleveland.  In 1976, several women’s groups in the Cleveland area had 
obtained a foundation grant to establish Ohio’s first emergency shelter for battered women.  At 
that time, when Richard Celeste was Lieutenant Governor, he and his wife provided their own 
home to serve as that shelter.   
 Celeste became Governor of Ohio in 1982, and he was elected to a second term in 1986.  
During these years, Dagmar Celeste was provided an office and a staff in the state house and 
became an advisor to her husband’s administration.  Soon after his election, Dagmar Celeste 
began visiting the women’s prison in Marysville, Ohio, learned that many of the incarcerated 
women had been victims of intimate violence, and generated support for recovery programs and 
other services to be made available to them.  These experiences led Dagmar Celeste to propose 
to her husband that he undertake a wide-ranging review of the cases of incarcerated battered 
women to determine who among them might be deserving of gubernatorial clemency.101   
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 The political prospects for clemency improved when the Ohio Supreme Court changed 
state law regarding the admission of expert testimony in trials of women charged with assaulting 
or killing their batterers.  In 1981, just before Richard Celeste had become Governor, the Ohio 
Supreme Court had decided State v. Thomas, upholding the murder conviction of a battered 
woman despite the trial judge’s exclusion of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome.102  
In March 1990, the Court reversed itself.  In the landmark case of State v. Koss, the Court 
overturned a battered woman’s conviction for voluntary manslaughter against her batterer due to 
the exclusion of expert testimony concerning battered woman syndrome.103  Later in 1990, the 
state legislature adopted a statute permitting the admission of expert testimony about battered 
woman syndrome in the trial of a defendant who raises self-defense to charges that she 
committed violence against her batterer.104   
 Governor Celeste was responsive to concerns that women tried before the passage of the 
legislation and the decision in the landmark case might have been unjustly convicted and 
sentenced.  He understood arguments that they had been denied a fair opportunity to explain how 
battering and its consequences influenced their situations and supported their defenses.  The First 
Lady and her staff were undoubtedly helpful in formulating these arguments and urging them as 
a basis for political action.  Consequently, the Governor initiated a clemency process.   
 In November of 1989, while the legislation was under discussion and the landmark case 
was pending, Governor Celeste instructed his staff to review the cases of battered women 
convicted of crimes against their batterers.  He wanted to identify those women whose crimes 
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grew out of their victimization by a violent partner.  After instructing the state correctional 
authority to cooperate in obtaining this research, the Governor received a report recognizing over 
200 such women.  Many of them were serving sentences on the order of twenty-five years to life, 
and a few were under death sentence.  The candidates for clemency were selected from among 
this group.   
 Over the course of a year, the governor’s staff educated themselves and the Ohio Parole 
Board concerning battering, self-defense, and the trial process of those who had been convicted 
of violence against their batterers.  The education process included meetings with the 
incarcerated women themselves.  Since most of these women had been involved in support 
groups that the First Lady’s previous advocacy had helped to create, they were better able to 
articulate their experiences with both battering and the court system, and they were better able to 
advocate for clemency on their own behalves.  After exhaustively reviewing the incarcerated 
women’s case files, the Governor’s staff distributed applications for clemency to more than a 
hundred women.  The women’s groups in the prison and their supporters played a central role in 
disseminating information about the clemency process and in obtaining assistance for individual 
women in preparing their petitions.105   
 The Governor and his staff reviewed over one hundred cases, seeking to document and 
verify the history of abuse described in the clemency petitions.  After eliminating cases of 
women who had convictions for prior violence or records of disruptive prison behavior, the staff 
sought to identify the cases in which the women had been unable to defend themselves 
adequately at trial.  They isolated a group of cases in which they were persuaded that had jurors 
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been able to hear expert testimony about battered woman syndrome and evidence about a well-
documented history of abuse, they may have decided differently.  The Ohio Parole Board 
recommended clemency in eighteen of these cases.106   
 The national clemency movement was ignited when in the winter of 1990, a few weeks 
before he left office, Governor Celeste exceeded the board’s recommendations and commuted 
the sentences of a total of twenty-seven women who had served or were serving sentences for 
violence, typically lethal violence, against their batterers.  The Governor pardoned a twenty-
eighth woman who had already been released on parole.  As a condition of their release from 
prison or from parole supervision, the women were required to perform 200 hours of community 
service in a domestic violence context.107   
 An outcry immediately erupted in the media from those, most of them law enforcement 
officials, who opposed the governor’s commutations.108  Others praised his courage, personal 
integrity, and sense of fairness.109  Some petitioners who had shared support groups with the 
twenty-eight women who received clemency from Governor Celeste were devastated when they 
did not receive clemency as well, and some of their supporters believed that the Governor would 
have been justified in granting an even greater number of petitions.110   
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 Despite the controversies about whether Governor Celeste had done too much or too 
little, none of the cases in which he granted relief came back to haunt him in the future.  
Although a few of the battered woman he released were convicted of minor crimes thereafter, 
recidivism proved a negligible problem.  Of the few women who returned to the criminal courts, 
none returned for a crime of violence.  Rather, in support of the view that Governor Celeste 
exercised his discretionary power cautiously, most of the women who were released after 
receiving clemency are living and working in their communities to this day.111   
 Events in Ohio caught the attention of feminist activists and battered women’s advocates 
nationwide.  Governor Celeste’s precedent-setting grants of clemency to a group of battered 
women convicted of violent crimes against their batterers reverberated widely.  Drawing on the 
strategies and experiences of those involved in the Ohio clemency project,  a legal reform 
movement was born.112   
 C. The Maryland Experience: The Power of Narrative 
 In the 1980s, while litigation and legislation efforts on behalf of battered women were 
underway in Ohio and other states, battered women’s advocates in Maryland were unsuccessful 
in obtaining legal rulings through the courts that authorized the admission of expert testimony on 
                                                 
111  See Linda L. Ammons, Why Do You Do The Things You Do? Clemency for Battered Incarcerated Women, A 
Decade’s Review, 11 J. OF  GENDER, SOC. POL. & L. 533, 564-65 (2003).   
 
112  Linda Ammons, Executive Assistant to Governor Celeste during the clemency review process, writes: 
 Within days after the Ohio project was completed, I received calls from advocates from 
Maryland and New York.  Weeks later I briefly consulted with persons, working with or for the 
late Governor Lawton Chiles of Florida. In the fall of 1991, I appeared before a California 
Assembly committee at Frontera Prison in California to talk about this issue in connection with an 
attempt to have Governor Pete Wilson review cases.  Representatives working on behalf of 
battered women wanted to know how best to tell their clients’ stories and what evidence would 
work best to persuade those who would make decisions about the women’s fates. 
 Id. at 564 n.145.   
 
 33
battered woman syndrome when battered women faced trial for violence against their batterers.113  
Responding to this failure, Maryland’s battered women’s advocates organized a powerful 
educational initiative.  This initiative formed the backdrop to a larger project of law reform.   
 The public education initiative in Maryland drew from the consciousness-raising methods 
that had emerged in the feminist movement and from the related storytelling strategies that 
groups of women and other disempowered groups had been using to convey their all-too-often-
ignored experiences.  Exposure to these experiences was conceived as a vehicle for promoting 
insights that might generate social change.  In furtherance of its educational strategy to promote 
this exposure, the coalition of advocates arranged a number of settings in which women 
convicted of violence against their abusers could tell the stories of their relationships, the abuse 
they had suffered, and the circumstances leading to their acts of violence against their intimate 
partners.114   
 In order to disseminate these gripping, poignant, and horrifying stories to a broader 
audience, the Maryland advocates produced a short film entitled A Plea for Justice which was 
released early in 1990.  In the film, four women serving sentences on the order of fifteen years to 
life for killing their batterers tell the stories of their experiences with their violent partners.  The 
advocates’ intentions were to create conditions under which viewers might experience 
vicariously the women’s life-threatening predicaments, their suffering, fear, and isolation.  Their 
hope was that the film would render battered women as sympathetic and their claims of self-
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defense--that they killed their batterers because they saw no other way to save themselves—
credible and understandable.  
 Unlike Governor Celeste of Ohio, Governor William Donald Schaefer of Maryland had 
shown no prior interest in issues of domestic violence.  Yet after the Governor had viewed the 
film with members of his staff, he requested a meeting at the Maryland women’s prison with the 
women interviewed on video.  The meeting was arranged, giving Governor Schaefer the 
opportunity to communicate in person with the women in the film and to hear from other 
similarly situated women as well.  Later the Governor told reporters that the meeting had altered 
his understanding of the problems that battered women face.  Subsequently, he expressed interest 
in receiving petitions for clemency, promoted the adoption of state legislation to improve 
domestic violence training for judges, and supported legislation that required in appropriate cases 
the admission at trial of testimony about battering and its effects.   
 Many other state officials in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of 
government viewed A Plea for Justice.  The media covered the release of the film and the issues 
depicted in the film as well.  When battered women’s advocates eventually prevailed in 
obtaining legislation that authorized the admission of evidence of battered woman syndrome in 
battered women’s self-defense cases, this success was in no small measure due to the far-
reaching persuasive power of the widely viewed thirty-minute video.115   
 Following their dramatically effective educational and legislative campaign, the coalition 
of battered women’s advocates embarked on a clemency project.  After identifying women who 
had suffered abuse and were incarcerated for crimes related to that abuse and notifying them 
about the possibility of filing petitions for clemency, thirty women requested interviews for 
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clemency purposes.  On January 23, 1991, after a process of interviewing and verification, the 
advocates filed a voluminous confidential report seeking clemency for twelve women serving 
extended sentences for violence against their batterers.   
 Relying on the increased awareness of the plight of battered women, the petitions detailed 
the individual experiences of each petitioner, her background, the abuse she suffered, and the 
events leading to the crime of which she was convicted.  The request for clemency was rooted in 
the fact that much of this information had not been offered or considered prior to the verdict or 
the sentence in each of the cases.  In selecting twelve women to recommend for clemency, the 
advocates decided to pursue relief in those cases most likely to win the Governor’s approval.116   
 On February 19, 1991, Governor Schaefer commuted the sentences of eight of the 
incarcerated battered women.117  When he received further advocacy on behalf of the remaining 
four, he decided to grant early parole to two of them.  The women’s advocates helped those who 
had received clemency with the considerable transition difficulties--including housing, job 
placement, psychological adjustment, and media attention--that they would face upon re-entering 
society.  Through this assistance the advocates hoped to facilitate the released women’s social re-
entry and thereby reduce the potential political repercussions for Governor Schaefer.118  By so 
doing, they would enhance the chances that other battered women might receive clemency in the 
future. 
 Fueled by its rapid success and national acclaim, the notion of clemency as a kind of 
partial justice for battered women incarcerated for killing their batterers had caught fire.  With 
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Governor Schaefer’s clemencies in Maryland following so closely on the heels of Governor 
Celeste’s pathbreaking actions in Ohio, the national clemency movement took hold.  Feminist 
activists and battered women’s advocates organized clemency movements in many states and 
began requesting state governors to provide sentence relief to battered women incarcerated for 
crimes of violence against their batterers.   
 
 D. The Massachusetts Experience: The Framingham Eight 
 In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, eight women who were incarcerated in the 
women’s prison in Framingham, Massachusetts for having killed their batterers were meeting in 
a support and consciousness-raising group facilitated by a human rights activist.  Due to 
similarities in their experiences, the incarcerated women took on a collective identity.119  They 
called themselves the Framingham Eight, a sobriquet that implied solidarity among them and 
that, in part as a result of this implication, caught the media’s attention.  The battered women’s 
advocates in Massachusetts consciously developed a media strategy to try to cultivate public 
understanding of battered women forced to defend their lives.120     
 By 1991, sympathetic stories prominently featured in the Boston press exposed the 
lethality of violence against women and linked cases of women killed by intimate partners to the 
cases of the Framingham Eight.121  In that year, the legislature addressed questions of legal 
protection for victims of intimate violence.122  Subsequently, Governor William Weld, a 
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Republican who while socially moderate had also adopted a tough-on-crime persona, amended 
the guidelines for commutation of sentences to include “a history of abuse [that] significantly 
contributed to…the offense.”123  This amendment was the first official action in the country that 
formally increased battered women’s access to clemency relief.   
 In response to this perceived invitation, a coalition of women’s advocacy groups 
recruited attorneys to represent each of The Framingham Eight in a quest for a commutation of 
her sentence.124  On February 14, 1992, each of the eight respective defense teams filed a petition 
for commutation, detailing the petitioner’s history of abuse and arguing that because each was 
tried before recent improvements in legal protections, she was therefore deserving of equitable 
relief.125  Public hearings before the Advisory Board of Pardons and Parole were held in seven of 
the cases.  Although some of the petitioners received other forms of relief, Governor Weld 
officially commuted just two of the sentences.126   
 Before the clemency process in Massachusetts had concluded, the legislature had enacted 
a law that guaranteed the admission in appropriate cases of a history of abuse and expert 
testimony about battering and its effects.127  An independent film called Defending Our Lives 
which featured interviews with four of the Framingham Eight won an Academy Award as the 
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year’s best short documentary film.128  The Framingham Eight had obtained not only some 
sentence relief, but their stories had also received national attention as part of a public 
educational movement. 
 E. California: Many Requests, Little Relief 
 As in Massachusetts, the California clemency movement began with the formation of 
support groups for incarcerated battered women.  In March of 1991, members of the group that 
met in Frontera, the major women’s prison in southern California, wrote to Governor Pete 
Wilson asking him to consider sentence commutations for all of the California women who were 
serving time for killing their batterers.  Governor Wilson responded by indicating that he would 
not conduct a statewide review of all of the cases of women incarcerated for killing their 
batterers, but that, in the absence of any other requisite clemency protocols, he would consider 
the letter an application for clemency by the 34 women who had signed it.  He proceeded to 
conduct a review of the signatories’ cases.129   
 Inspired by the Governor’s apparent openness to considering such clemency requests, 
activists in California’s battered women’s movement decided to organize a large group of 
attorneys to prepare clemency petitions for all of the women incarcerated for killing their 
batterers.  While they were engaged in the petition-drafting process, the California legislature 
considered a bill creating a right to introduce expert testimony on battered woman syndrome in 
appropriate cases.130  A number of legislators traveled to Frontera to hear the testimony of several 
incarcerated battered women who spoke about their abuse, their efforts to secure help, and their 
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need to protect themselves.131  When the battered woman syndrome bill was subsequently 
enacted, the petitioners had an additional argument for clemency, as all of them were convicted 
before the right to expert testimony was guaranteed.   
 In 1992, attorneys filed clemency petitions for 34 battered women, a group that contained 
only some of the signatories to the initial letter to Governor Wilson.132  In May of 1993, 
Governor Wilson announced that he had reviewed six of these petitioners’cases, and ten of those 
who had signed the letter.  He reduced the sentence of two petitioners, one a 78-year-old inmate 
in failing health, and another, Brenda Aris, who after killing her abusive husband while he slept 
and failing to obtain relief through the courts, became eligible for parole a number of years 
earlier than her original sentence provided.133   
 In the next several years, Governor Wilson either denied relief or denied review in 
virtually all other battered women’s clemency cases.  Although in 1992 he signed legislation that 
required parole commissioners to receive training concerning battered woman syndrome and 
domestic violence,134 in 1993 he vetoed broadly supported bipartisan legislation that would have 
afforded battered women convicted before the guarantee of expert testimony an opportunity for 
review of their original trials.135  Despite a benefit showing of Defending Our Lives in California 
in 1994, combined with a concerted media campaign by incarcerated battered women and their 
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supporters, Governor Wilson could not be moved to provide significant relief.136  With the base 
of his political support lying squarely among social conservatives, Governor Wilson apparently 
determined that his political future as a law and order politician was best protected by distancing 
himself from the movement to assist incarcerated battered women.   
 Governor Wilson’s successor to office, Governor Gray Davis, borrowed the same 
political calculus.  Seeking to bolster support among conservative voters, Davis vowed during 
the gubernatorial campaign to let no murderer go free during his term of office.137  Under a new 
state law, however, the parole board was required to consider information regarding battered 
woman syndrome in any cases tried before such evidence had been rendered admissible.  
Although the parole board reviewed a few dozen cases, found battered woman syndrome to exist 
in a number of them, and recommended parole in eight of those cases, Governor Davis endorsed 
release on parole in only two of these cases.138   
 F. Florida: Selective Advocacy 
 Florida has restrictive rules for seeking gubernatorial clemency.  No one convicted in 
Florida may apply for a pardon until at least ten years after the completion of any sentence or 
parole conditions.  No one may apply for a commutation without the consent of the Governor, 
two cabinet members, and a recommendation of the Florida Parole Commission. 
 The first stage of battered women’s clemency activism in Florida took the form of 
modifying these restrictions to enlarge the prospects for clemency.139  Aided by a media 
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 41
campaign, these efforts prevailed.140  Effective January, 1992, Governor Lawton Chiles revised 
Florida’s clemency procedures to enable a woman who was incarcerated for killing her batterer 
and who could demonstrate a history of abuse, to ask the Parole Commission to waive the usual 
application consent policies and to refer her case to a panel of experts on issues of intimate 
violence.  If the panel determined that the petitioner suffered from battered women syndrome at 
the time of the offense, then the Parole Commission would recommend that the Governor and the 
Cabinet review the case for a possible commutation of sentence.141   
 In a 1993 case known as Rogers v. State, the Florida Court of Appeals authorized the 
admission of expert testimony on battered woman syndrome in appropriate cases.142  Despite the 
new case and the new rules for clemency, Florida’s battered women’s activists chose to proceed 
cautiously, avoiding mass applications for clemency and recommending that each petitioner file 
an individual request for commutation.  By the end of 1993, sixteen battered women had filed an 
individual application for clemency under Florida’s revised procedures.143  After separate 
hearings, two women were granted clemency and they were released from prison in 1993.144  
Seven others ultimately were granted commutations and released, but only after completing a 
prison work-release program.145   
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 Given the potential for politicization of the clemency issue, battered women’s advocates 
chose not to file additional clemency petitions during the Lawton Chiles-Jeb Bush gubernatorial 
campaign of 1994.  After Chiles was re-elected, efforts to obtain more commutations increased.  
Attorneys prepared and filed ten battered women’s clemency petitions in 1996, focusing on the 
cases which had the greatest chance of success, then submitted more petitions in 1998.146  After 
granting a couple of additional clemencies, Governor Chiles died late in 1998.147   
 When interim Governor Buddy MacKay took office, he granted the clemency petitions of 
six more women incarcerated for killing their batterers.148  The clemency prospects for 
incarcerated battered women in Florida were significantly diminished when Jeb Bush was voted 
into the governorship in the next election.  Battered women’s advocates accuse Governor Bush 
of ignoring the legitimate claims to relief filed by battered women incarcerated in Florida’s 
burgeoning prison system.149   
 G.  Illinois: Electoral Strategizing 
 After two Chicago defense attorneys obtained individual commutations for four 
incarcerated women, they decided to organize a broader clemency project, staffed by attorneys, 
activists, law professors, and law students.150  Founded in 1993, the Illinois Clemency Project 
conducted inmate outreach leading to the submission of twelve clemency petitions in 1994.  
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After hearings before the Illinois Prisoner Review Board, which forwards its recommendation to 
the governor confidentially, Governor Jim Edgar granted four commutations in May, 1994.151   
 Governor Edgar’s commutation decisions were likely influenced by his re-election 
strategy.  His 1994 gubernatorial opponent was a liberal woman.  As long as he could justify his 
decision to grant clemency to four battered women, he could capitalize on an opportunity to 
appeal to some of his opponent’s potential supporters without risking the transfer of any of his 
conservative support to her.152  Although the clemency petitioners had consciously avoided using 
the concept of battered woman syndrome in their requests for relief, based on concerns about the 
message that such psychological language conveys, Governor Edgar framed his justification for 
granting relief in those terms.153   
 In July of 1995, the Illinois Clemency Project filed eighteen additional petitions for 
commutation.  In this wave of applications, the petitioners included the language of battered 
woman syndrome, because the Governor had previously favored granting relief on that basis.   
This time Governor Edgar decided to release one woman after she had served fifteen years of a 
twenty-nine year sentence, and to deny the seventeen other requests for commutation.154   
 Although additional commutation petitions were filed on behalf of incarcerated battered 
women during Governor Edgar’s term of office, the Governor granted relief in just a few more 
cases.155  Without an election strategy to be advanced by his clemency decisions, Governor Edgar 
approved battered women’s petitions for clemency on an extremely meager basis.  His successor 
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in office, Governor George Ryan, celebrated for his blanket commutations in death penalty 
cases, denied three requests for clemency by battered women, but commuted the sentence of 
one.156    
 H.  Kentucky: A Sympathetic Governor 
 In a 1990 case called Commonwealth v. Craig, the Kentucky Supreme Court embraced 
an expansive understanding of battered woman syndrome.  Reversing prior law, the Court 
indicated that battered woman syndrome was not a psychological condition about which only a 
mental health professional could attest, but one about which information on the dynamics of 
battering and its consequences was broadly relevant.157  After this case was decided, battered 
women’s advocates filed a number of petitions for clemency.  In December 1991, just before he 
left office, Governor Wallace Wilkinson pardoned one petitioner who had already served her 
prison term, and denied relief to two other incarcerated battered women who had petitioned for 
clemency.158     
 In 1992, the Kentucky legislature enacted a law concerning battered women’s self-
defense that also established various reforms without relying on the concept of battered woman 
syndrome.  Instead, the legislation reconceived the notion of imminent harm for purposes of 
battered women’s self-defense.  In self-defense cases involving domestic violence, the 1992 law 
permitted a defendant’s asserted belief that danger was imminent to be supported by evidence 
that the victim had a history of serious and repeated abuse of the defendant.159   
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 The 1992 act also amended certain requirements that violent felony offenders serve 
prison terms of a prescribed minimum duration, providing an exemption from these requirements 
for those convicted of killing their batterers.  Finally, for offenders who had not previously had 
the opportunity to present evidence of their history of abuse, the act afforded a right to file 
motions to present such evidence in their original trial courts.  This provision proved less 
consequential than it might have been, because few trial court judges complied.  Their non-
compliance apparently stemmed from their failure to appreciate the rationale for providing this 
admittedly unusual re-hearing of a set of facts concerning a case in which the offender was 
already serving a prison sentence.160   
 These legislative changes became effective soon after Governor Brereton Jones took 
office.  In 1993, he appointed Helen Howard-Hughes, who had expressed interest in domestic 
violence issues, to chair the Kentucky Parole Board.  Howard-Hughes was responsive to the 
suggestions of battered women’s activists that she review for clemency consideration the cases 
of women incarcerated for assaulting or killing their batterers.161  In 1995, she arranged for all 
members of the Parole Board to receive training in domestic violence issues.  Thereafter, the 
Parole Board reviewed a number of battered women’s cases that had been identified by Howard-
Hughes and developed for clemency by attorneys in the public defender’s office.162   
 The Parole Board determined that fourteen incarcerated battered women should be 
considered for release on early parole.  Five of these cases were scheduled for an early parole 
hearing, but under law nine others were prohibited from early parole review until they had served 
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a longer minimum prison sentence.  Since these nine women had petitioned for clemency, the 
Parole Board recommended that the Governor commute their sentences to a level at which they 
could receive hearings for early parole as well.163   
 Due to positive relations with the media that had been developed by battered women’s 
advocates, the press became an ally in the quest for clemency.  The media had shown particular 
interest in the life stories of the incarcerated women, especially in a quilt that they had made in 
their prison support group to depict their experiences with violence. Indeed, the Governor had 
reportedly been moved upon viewing the quilt in 1995 when it was displayed at the Kentucky 
State Fair.  The governor had also received many letters describing and documenting these 
experiences from the women themselves, and some members of the Parole Board had viewed a 
video in which the incarcerated women described their experiences with violence.164   
 On December 11, 1995, Governor Jones granted the requested clemencies, resulting in 
the release of nine women in January of 1996 on early parole.  The Governor also pardoned a 
woman who had already served her prison sentence.165  The Governor denied four subsequent 
clemency requests, but the Parole Board released other battered women who did not need 
clemency in order to be considered for parole.166  In the course of a few years and with the help 
of a sympathetic governor, battered women’s activists in Kentucky had achieved considerable 
success.   
 I.  Clemency Nationwide 
                                                 
163  See Gagné, supra note 93, at 128-129.   
 
164  See Fran Ellers, Jones Explains Commuted Sentences, Governor, Abuse Victims on ‘Donahue’, LOUISVILLE 
COURIER-JOURNAL, Mar. 15, 1996, at 09B.   
 
165  Fran Ellers, Jones Grants Women Clemency: Nine Inmates Say Abuse Led Them to Commit Crimes, LOUISVILLE 
COURIER-JOURNAL, Dec. 12, 1995, at 1A.   
 
166  See Gagné, supra note 93, at 130.   
 
 47
 Before the 1990s had ended, hundreds of battered women had petitioned dozens of 
governors for clemency.  In some cases, the clemency movement yielded significant victories, in 
others, searing disappointments.  Across the country more than 100 of the battered women who 
petitioned for clemency were successful in obtaining it.167   
 In addition to the clemencies in the states examined above, a limited number of battered 
women received sentence relief from several other governors.  Governor Roy Romer of Colorado 
granted sentence commutations to four battered women at the same time that he denied clemency 
to four other petitioners.168  Governors George Pataki of New York, Steve Merrill of New 
Hampshire, Terry Brandstad of Iowa, and Barbara Roberts of Oregon each granted clemency to 
one battered woman who had petitioned for relief.169  Even a law enforcer as harsh as United 
States Attorney General John Ashcroft reduced the sentences of two battered women when he 
was Governor of Missouri.170  Other governors who have granted clemency to battered women on 
at least one occasion are Fife Symington of Arizona, Charles Roemer of Louisiana, James Martin 
of North Carolina, and Gary Locke of Washington.171   
 Many of the governors defended their clemency decisions on the grounds that they 
believed the petitioners had been suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of the 
crime, had been trapped in abusive relationships, and had been unable to offer a complete 
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account of their abuse to a jury.  Most used a rhetoric of justice and proportionality to support 
their decisions.  Occasionally notions of mercy and compassion were invoked as well.172   
 
V. Continuing Challenges 
 A.  Victims of Intimate Violence 
 As illuminated by the battered women’s clemency movement and recent efforts to 
address the problems of intimate violence, the past generation’s cultural support for battered 
women has both wrought tremendous changes and revealed profound challenges.  Perhaps the 
most significant change is that groundbreaking legal and political developments have 
reconceived intimate violence as no longer a personal matter in a private relationship, but one of 
major social dimensions.  Nevertheless, the problem of violence in intimate relationships remains 
frighteningly frequent and severe, and battered women’s mortality rates remain tragically high.173   
 Battered women confront continuing problems, beyond the physical and psychological 
harm that they suffer and the disruption that their efforts to obtain help can entail.  For a variety 
of reasons, some women may wish to remain in relationship with their batterers and have 
difficulty finding interventions that are supportive of that choice and are also effective in 
reducing the violence that they suffer.174  Some of these women resist the mandatory nature of 
criminal court involvement and resent the new reality that obtaining assistance during violent 
episodes is conditioned on an arrest and a prosecution that they may not support.175   
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 Many of those who wish to sever relationships with their batterers still find that the threat 
of violence does not end, but rather increases, with an attempt to end the relationship.176  
Moreover, even in these high-risk situations, legal and social services for battered women—just 
as for other needy populations who cannot pay for services--remain significantly underfunded, 
and are especially vulnerable to further funding cuts in a declining economy.177  This lack of 
material resources for  programs and individuals makes independent living exceedingly difficult 
for many who try to leave their abusive partners.178  Those with children have an additional need 
for material resources and for negotiating continuing relationships with batterers in many 
circumstances, due to the requirements of child custody and visitation.   
 The law of child custody and visitation has formally acknowledged the problem of 
domestic violence.179  Nevertheless, decisionmaking in child custody cases is often insufficiently 
sensitive to the problems generated by intra-family violence.180  Moreover, a perceived failure to 
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adequately protect children from witnessing or experiencing a partner’s violence can jeopardize 
an abused parent’s own liberty or custodial rights.181   
 
 
 B.  Battered Women as Defendants 
 1. Prosecution 
 The extraordinary difficulties that battered women face even in an improved social and 
legal climate become more pronounced if she uses self-defense.  In some respects, the perception 
that help is now available to her deepens her plight when she defends herself physically.  
Despite, or perhaps because of, public education concerning domestic violence, the reality that 
many battered women have greater recourse than in the past can turn the “why didn’t she leave?” 
question in any particular case into an even more haunting refrain.   
 When battered women are prosecuted for assault or homicide against their batterers, their 
accounts of underlying events continue to be regarded with skepticism.  Criminal defendants, in 
general, tend to confront disbelief of their claims.  The charges against them render their 
mitigating or exonerating accounts of events inherently suspect.  Even when these accounts are 
truthful, they may be disbelieved because they are self-serving.182   
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 Once charges have been filed, the adversary nature of the criminal justice system 
exacerbates skepticism, such that those who are allied with law enforcement feel professionally 
impelled toward disbelief of a battered woman’s accounts.  This disbelief carries a particular 
bite, as it often takes the form of an expression of support for battered woman as a class, 
followed by an assertion that this defendant is not a member of that class.183  The problem of 
intimate violence seems to have more credibility and visibility in the abstract than it does when 
particular human beings—imperfect as they are-- in a particular context—factually complex as it 
will be-- are said to embody the problem.   
 
 2. Oversimplification 
 The adversarial legal system tends to reject complexity and insist that all human conduct 
be distilled into simple explanations.184  Explaining that battering relationships are typically 
characterized not just by physical violence but by other manifestations of coercive control 
requires a more sophisticated analysis of the long-term dynamics of the relationship rather than 
descriptions of violent episodes.185  Suggesting that a battering relationship may also include 
genuine forms of connection may be threatening to the listener--whether a judge, a jury member 
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or anyone else—because it invites comparison to one’s own intimate relationships rather than 
facilitating the psychological distancing that makes sitting in judgment more comfortable.186   
 Women who take self-defensive measures during a lull in the abuse rather than during a 
confrontation with their abuser are especially vulnerable to the simple assertion that they acted in 
angry retaliation rather than in fear for their lives.  Explaining how it can be reasonable to 
believe that you risk serious, imminent harm during a lull in the abuse requires considerable 
psychological and contextual knowledge.187  It is far easier to ignore or dismiss these 
complexities, and the adversarial legal system, built around the human desire for simplicity, 
facilitates this reaction.   
 3. Gender Stereotyping 
 Despite significant social progress in coming to understand the problem of intimate 
violence, traditional notions of gender remain a powerful force in the assessment of any battered 
woman’s self-defense claims.  Actual women--diverse, flawed, and complex—often fall short of 
the cultural ideal and are found less credible.  If understanding her situation requires 
understanding the long and psychologically complex dynamic of a relationship, the adversarial 
system is a poor forum for conveying that truth.  The consequence is that many battered women 
are disbelieved.  In these circumstances, disbelief can have dire consequences, including 
incarceration, injury, and even death.188   
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 The more the accused diverges from the internalized cultural understanding of the good 
battered woman, the greater her credibility problems.  Perhaps not surprisingly, experience has 
shown that the features of the good battered woman stereotype are drawn from the traditional 
female stereotype to the extent that the less demure, docile, and deferential the battered woman is 
seen to be, the more credibility problems she has encountered.189  Battered women’s survival 
strategies, such as self-medication with drugs or alcohol, and previous instances of fighting back, 
may lead to a counterstory that she provoked intimate violence.190  Women who are perceived to 
fall outside narrow and traditional gender role expectations of mainstream culture, whether by 
dint of personality (e.g. independent, assertive) or identity (e.g. lesbians, African-American 
women), face particular difficulties in having their claims to have acted out of fear for their lives 
seen and heard.191   
 4. Impeaching Credibility 
 Battered women’s credibility problems are exacerbated by the fact that the techniques 
routinely used by the legal system to assess credibility do not comport with psychological 
understandings of reactions to trauma.  For example, a standard technique in the adversary 
system is to impeach a witness’ credibility by showing that the witness made prior inconsistent 
statements about pertinent events, making it more likely that current statements are 
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manufactured.192  Psychologists, on the other hand, indicate that among the consequences of 
trauma are confusion, disorientation, and memory repression, such that soon after a violent event 
a woman may provide the police an account that during a recovery process, she comes to know 
as false or incomplete.193   
 A court’s evidentiary system is organized around an understanding that contemporaneous 
accounts are more accurate than subsequent accounts.  Therefore battered women may confront a 
paradox.  The memory complications that can flow from the violence that some battered women 
suffer are regarded as undermining the reliability of current accounts of that violence.  Yet with 
respect to the psychological reality of the situation, initial memory problems may actually 
support a finding that she suffered significant trauma, and subsequent accounts may be the most 
accurate versions of events.194   
 5. Expert Testimony 
 If a psychological expert’s testimony on battered woman syndrome is admitted during 
such a case, the expert can address the impact of trauma on memory and try to mitigate the harm 
done by standard evidentiary practices.  But the admissibility of expert testimony remains a 
double-edged sword in these cases.  With its admission typically linked to the concept of 
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“battered woman syndrome”, expert testimony can illuminate a battered woman’s situation only 
to the extent that the features of the situation are understood as aspects of the syndrome.195    
 As many commentators have observed, viewing a victim of abuse as suffering from a 
syndrome deflects attention from the abuser, and undermines an understanding that she 
conducted herself reasonably, albeit in desperate circumstances.196  This syndrome evidence, 
conjuring up images that the abuse victim suffers from a pathology, can have an adverse impact 
on perceptions of her reliability.  These adverse inferences can influence outcomes of legal 
proceedings and haunt other important efforts to achieve stability in her life as well.197   
 6. Inadequate Defense Services 
 Another challenge for battered women charged with crimes against batterers is that few 
locales have made significant progress in recent decades in improving the quality of indigent 
defense systems.  In many jurisdictions, battered women charged with assault or homicide 
against their batterers still receive woefully deficient representation, particularly when they are 
represented by appointed counsel.198   
 Given the poor quality of representation for many who cannot afford to hire competent 
counsel, the progress of the domestic violence movement in enabling fairer trials for battered 
women remains hypothetical for a defendant whose counsel does not appreciate the nature and 
circumstances of the underlying events, the context of the defendant’s relationship, the need for 
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198  See supra note 79 and accompanying text.   
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psychological expertise, or the prospects for raising self-defense issues during the course of the 
case.  In these circumstances, the factual record that might support self-defense can remain 
underdeveloped and fair outcomes impeded.  Until indigent defense systems provide reasonably 
competent counsel on a reliable basis, battered women who have assaulted or killed their 
batterers, a subset of indigent defendants, will not be guaranteed the benefit of the progress that 
has been made in obtaining fairer treatment in the legal system for battered women.   
 7. Post-Conviction Relief 
 Once a battered woman has been convicted of assault or homicide against her batterer, 
her chances for vindication through appeal, collateral attack, or executive clemency are low.  
Those who participated in obtaining the conviction often are institutionally invested in 
maintaining the original outcome and seek to preserve it.  Decisionmakers with the power to 
overturn convictions or reduce sentences will naturally use this power quite sparingly. 199 For 
battered women, these phenomena have become even stronger, since our culture considers itself 
to have vastly improved its understanding and treatment of domestic violence.  While this belief 
is partially true, it also generates limited interest in addressing the problems that remain.   
 Even for women who were convicted of crimes against their batterers before recent legal 
innovations, the clemency movement has achieved at best mixed success. Despite the 
approximately one hundred battered women across the nation who have received gubernatorial 
clemency, hundreds more have been denied.  Many of these women have strong arguments for 
clemency, yet their clemency petitions did not find a receptive audience at the statehouse.  As a 
result, they serve the remainder of their sentences as originally imposed.   
                                                 
199  See, e.g., Dalton & Schneider supra note 28, at 741 (reporting the results of a 1995 study finding that 63% of 
convictions and sentences of battered women were upheld on appeal.) See also Hallye Jordan, Gov. Davis Revising 
‘No Parole’ Policy as Public Opinion Relaxes, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 28, 2000 (reporting statements by 
Governor Gray Davis that commutation is to be granted on “rare occasions”).     
 
 57
 58
 
VI. Conclusion 
 Intimate violence is linked to inequalities in perceptions and allocations of power within 
relationships.  While any relationship can feature power disparities, women remain especially 
vulnerable to male violence in heterosexual relationships in a world of continuing gender 
inequality.  As long as gender inequality persists, the problem of intimate violence will remain 
intractable, although public attention to the problem can partially alleviate the extraordinary 
harm that intimate violence creates.200   
 The battered women’s movement has changed the world, creating many more options 
than previously existed for women who suffer intimate violence.  Indeed, the considerable 
successes of the recent past create an especially challenging context for sustaining the energy of 
the movement today.  Divisions within the movement about appropriate future directions can 
also drain its energies, and a difficult economic outlook makes competition for shrinking social 
services funds especially contentious.   
 Hopefully, the many eyes that have been turned to the problem and the many voices 
addressing it will prove up to the task of mobilizing to face the challenges ahead.  And hopefully, 
the multiplicity of perspectives that high interest in the subject has generated will bring strength 
rather than fragmentation.  The promise of a future containing far less intimate violence is well 
worth the struggle.  
                                                 
200  See Schneider, supra note 14, at 27 (“[T]he culture of female subordination that supports and maintains abuse 
has undergone little change.”).    
